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The Economic Structure of the Law of
International Organizations
Joel P. Trachtman*

Abstract
The essence of an internationalorganiqationis the delegation of decision-making authority
from individual states to the organiqation, which represents the collectivity of member states.
The focus of this Article is on the distinct formal structure and function of international
organiqations,as distinctfrom internationallaw per se. This Article evaluates the reasonsfor
creation of international organiations, as well as the reasons why particularstructures of
internationalorganizations are utilized. It evaluates the relationship among assignment of
subject matter authority, legislative capaci, adjudicative capaciy, enforcement capadly, and
membership. It examines how thesefeatures correspondto particularcontexts of international
cooperation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The essence of an international organization is the delegation of decisionmaking authority from individual states to the organization, representing the
collectivity of member states. The focus of this Article is on the distinct
structure and function of international organizations, as distinct from
international law per se. It would be simple to say that international
organizations are to international law as firms are to contracts: that states form
international organizations in order to reduce the transaction costs associated
with cooperation, as compared to the entry into international legal rules without
organizations. And it is true that the core questions are the same: why are these
institutions formed, what powers do they have, and how are they exercised?
While this analogy has some power and allows us to refer to the literature
of the theory of the firm,' it is too simple for several reasons. First, international
organizations are more heterogeneous than firms (although firms, too, are
heterogeneous). So, this Article will dissect international organizations before
seeking to provide an economic analysis of each component. The sum of the
components may differ from the parts, and so this Article will also discuss
synergies and conflicts among different components.
Second, and for similar reasons, international organizations and
international legal rules are not as dichotomous as they may at first seem.
Indeed, a similar observation may be made also about firms and long-term
contracts. Furthermore, international legal rules generally take advantage of a
default set of "organizational" features of international society, even if they are
not themselves housed within an international organization.
A. Defining International Organizations
Doctrinal definitions of international organizations are descriptively useful,
but do not generally refer to features that are analytically interesting from a
social scientific perspective. For example, a standard doctrinal definition of an
"international organization" can be found in the Draft Articles on Responsibility
of International Organizations (DARIO): .'[I]nternational organization' means
an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by
international law and possessing its own international legal personality.
International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other
entities." This formal doctrinal definition tells us little about the social function
See generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DiscoRD IN THE
WORLD PouTIcAL ECONOMY (1984); Joel P. Trachtman, The Theof of the Firm and the Theof of the
InternationalEconomicOrganitation:Toward Comparative InstitutionalAnaysis,17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
470 (1997).
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of international organizations. Jose Alvarez lists three somewhat similar elements
for use in defining international organizations: (1) establishment by agreement
between states; (2) existence of at least one organ capable of operating separately
from member states; and (3) operation under international law.2 These also are
largely important doctrinal parameters, but Alvarez's second parameter captures
a fundamental analytical characteristic: independence.3 Independence is at the
heart of delegation, as defined below, and is the central social scientifically
salient characteristic of international orgamzations.
B. Dissecting International Organizations
Below, I list some key functional features of international organizations.
1. Delegation. How much authority does the international organization
have? How much formal power does it have to affect state behavior?
Referring to a political science literature on this topic,' I adopt the term
"delegation" to name this parameter. The concepts of "legislation" and
"adjudication" mentioned below are best understood as modes of
exercise of delegated authority: the international organization is delegated
authority to make decisions-to legislate or to adjudicate-with respect
to a particular issue. Delegation has three essential components:
authority, independence in the exercise of authority, and bindingness.
a. "Authority," refers to the extent to which the international
organization is granted decision-making power with respect to a
particular subject matter.
b. "Independence," means independence from individual state
control, not independence from the control of the group of
member states as a collective principal. Independence from the
control of the collective principal would be pathological, unless
the collective principal is engaging in a self-commitment strategy.
c. "Bindingness," refers to the extent to which states must obey the
rules of the international organization. For example, if exit from
the international organization is costless, there is no bindingness,
and consequently no delegation. While exit is often formally
2

JosE E. ALVAREZ,

3

Abbott and Snidal provide a functional definition: "Two characteristics distinguish [international
organizations] from other international institutions: centralization (a concrete and stable
organizational structure and an administrative apparatus managing collective activities) and
independence (the authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in
defined spheres)." Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Wby States Act through FormalInternational
Organiaions,42 J. CONFuCT RESOL. 3, 9 (1998).

4

Kenneth W. Abbott, et al., The Concept ofl egaliraion,54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401-2 (2000) [hereinafter
Legalizationl.

Sumnmer 2014

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS 6 (2005).
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costless, it can be substantively costly: the costs of lost
opportunities for cooperation may exceed the benefits of exit.
2. Legislation. Second, how does the organization make decisions for
general application, within its area of delegation? We might refer to these
decisions as "legislation." Although not all decisions for general
application are produced through formal legislative-style processes, for
consistency of reference, I will refer to these decisions as "legislation."
The core question here, and one of "independence," is to what extent
individual states may veto or otherwise exercise a controlling influence
over legislation.
3. Adjudication. Third, how does the organization make decisions for
specific application to specific concerns or disputes? We might refer to
these decisions as "adjudication," although again, not all decisions for
specific application are produced through adjudicative processes.
Furthermore, while adjudication considers specific cases, the principles
established may be of general application, overlapping with "legislation."
Again, independence is a critical parameter.
4. Enforcement. Fourth, can the organization apply sanctions to states,
either directly or through authorization of application of sanctions by
other states? In a very important sense, enforcement is necessary to
delegation: unless decisions carry some force, the delegated authority on
which the decision is based is ephemeral. Enforcement may enhance
bindingness, but bindingness does not necessarily depend on formal
powers of enforcement: informal enforcement may be sufficient in many
cases.
5. Membership. Fifth, what is the composition of the organization-which
states are members?
6. Synergies and Conflicts. Sixth, what synergies or conflicts are there
between the various features of the international organization? Note that
the central two features are delegation and membership, with legislation,
adjudication, and enforcement best understood as subsidiary to
delegation. Legislation, adjudication, and enforcement relate to the scope
of delegated authority and the way in which it is exercised. How the
delegated authority is to be exercised will affect how much authority is
allocated to the organization. These features will also affect the
membership of the organization.
There are other features that could be evaluated, such as the size or
composition of the secretariat, the ability of the secretariat to set agendas or
even make decisions, the expertise of the secretariat, the financing of the
organization's activities, etc. These are important, but because their effect is
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largely informal, I do not address them here. This Article focuses on the formal
legal powers and actions of formal international organizations.5
For all of these features, the most interesting question is what the effects
are of each feature in connection with particular areas of international
cooperation? Stated slightly differently, how do these features correspond to
particular contexts of international cooperation? It is to be expected that states
would choose particular features in order to respond to particular aspects of the
relevant area of cooperation.
So there is no generally optimal international organization structure, but
this Article suggests that, for each international cooperation area, there is an
optimal international organization structure. I hasten to add that the optimal
international organization structure for any particular cooperation area may be
no international organization at all, or one that exists in formal terms, but has no
delegation as I have defined it. It is also to be expected that economies of scale
and scope might make it optimal to treat multiple areas of cooperation together
within a single international organization. Economies of scale or scope or other
synergies might make a structure optimal for addressing multiple areas, even if it
is not otherwise optimal for any one of the particular areas.
In two separate seminal studies, leading groups of international relations
scholars have proposed somewhat different features for taxonomizing
international institutions (a broader concept than international organizations
because "institutions" includes informal arrangements). Koremenos, Lipson, and
Snidal (the "Rational Design" project) propose focusing on membership, scope
of issues covered, centralization, rules for control, and flexibility.' The list I

5

While this Article will focus on formal powers, international organizations may have important
soft law functions. For example, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision carries out most of its
functions through accords that are not legally binding at the international level. These accords
have important behavioral effects. See CHRIS BRUMMER, Sonr LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM: RutE MAKING IN THE 21sT CENTURY (2012).

6

Barbara Koremenos, et al., The Rational Design of InternationalInstitutions, 55 INT'l. ORG. 761, 763,
770-73 (2001) [hereinafter Rational Design]. In Rational Design, Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal
suggest five key dimensions of international institutions: membership, scope of issues covered,
centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements. See also
Legalization, supra note 4, at 408-18. In Legalization, the authors focus on three elements of
legalization: obligation, precision, and delegation:
Obligation means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or
commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, it means that
they are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior
thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and
discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well. Precision
means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or
proscribe. Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to
implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to
make further rules.
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develop above draws a great deal from their work. I separate legislation from
adjudication within their "rules for control." In addition, their concepts of scope
of issues covered and centralization, when combined, is similar to the concept of
delegation that I use.' The concept of delegation that I use is adapted from the
list suggested by Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter (the "Legalization"
project).' However, their use of delegation focuses on authority,' while my use
of delegation highlights the fact that authority without binding force and
independence lacks behavioral implications.
I do not include flexibility from Rational Design, or precision from
Legalization, because for my purposes these are subsidiary issues-I am
interested in how the law is applied in accordancewith its terms, and those terms will
indeed include flexibility in the form of exceptions and escape clauses, as well as
more or less precision in particular circumstances. Indeed, "flexibility" is
included in all law in the sense that all law has limitations on its coverage. I
address a concept similar to precision when discussing the distinction between
more specific rules and more general standards in connection with dispute
resolution, but for different purposes.
Generally speaking, Rational Design and Legalization have somewhat
different purposes than mine here, as my focus is specifically on the formal role
of organizations, and how formal features of authority and the exercise of
authority might be chosen. For example, "scope" in the Rational Design work
does not have any formal significance except to the extent that it is aligned with
control."o So, by focusing on the formal, I can ignore scope to the extent that it
differs from my concept of delegation. Thus, for purposes of this Article, I will
focus on the six aspects listed above.

7

8

Rational Design, supranote 6, at 770-72.
Legalization, supra note 4, at 415--18.

9

Id.

10

Rational Design, sipranote 6, at 770-71.
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To summarize, the following table describes the three components of
delegation, as they each manifest themselves in legislative, adjudicative, and
executive functions of international organizations:
Characteristics

Authority

Independence

Bindingness

Legislative

Legislative
jurisdiction

Majority voting

Hard law

Adjudicative

Adjudicative
jurisdiction

Independence
from individual
states

Hard law
determination

Executive

Executive
authority

Independence
from individual
states after
appointment

Binding
determinations

Type

C. International Organizations and International Law
I am concerned in this Article with the distinct formal role of
organizations, as opposed to international law itself, in international cooperation.
Functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches to international organizations
made the mistake of moving directly from international cooperation problems to
organizational solutions. They elided a critical intermediate, and perhaps final,
step: the utility of international law separate from the establishment of additional
international organizational structures." But organizations are costly, and would
only be expected to be established where their benefits exceed their costs.12 It is
important to explain the need for international legal rules, and then separately
11

12

See generally Ernst B. Haas, The Study of RegionalIntegraion: The Jqys and Anguish of Pre-Theorising,24
INT'L. ORG. 607 (1970); see generally Ernst B. Haas, Turbulent Fields and the Theog of Regional
Integration,30 INT'L. ORG. 173 (1976).
Randall Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY
216 (. Banks & E. Hanushek eds., 1995); ANDREW SCHOTTER, THE ECONOMIc THEORY OF
SocIAL INSTITUTIONS (2008).
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and additionally to explain the need for international organizational structures to
make, interpret, enforce, and administer the rules.
Not all international law requires a discrete organization. Much
international law, including most customary international law but also certain
treaties, lacks a specialized secretariat, surveillance, dispute settlement, decisionmaking, and other organizational functions. The great body of customary
international law largely operates without specific organizational structures. One
theoretical justification for international organizations is to reduce the
transaction costs of international cooperation. 3 This is the Coasean story of the
market versus the firm, with the international organization playing the role of
firm, and the general international legal system playing the role of the market.14
But it is important to recognize that the market has institutions too, and
indeed is an organizational structure. Similarly, even without a function-specific
organization, the general international legal system performs some of the
organizational functions listed above. Therefore, the correct comparison is not
between having an organization and not having an organization, but between the
default organizational features of the international legal system, and an infinite
variety of customized organizational features that can be established in functionspecific organizations.
This comparison is analogous, within the original theory of the firm
setting, to one between contracting on the one hand, and establishment of a
similarly infinite variety of organizational features of a firm on the other hand.
Indeed, given the possibility of long-term, complex contracting and limitedfunction firms, the strict firm-contract dichotomy can be seen as too stark.
Rather, a more nuanced analysis is called for. This more nuanced analysis does
not simply establish features along a continuum of less to more "organization."
Rather, it is necessary to distinguish the role of different features of
organization, to understand the role of each feature in facilitating transactions
(or cooperation, as it is known in the international relations context), and also to
understand the relationship among the different features. As a starting point in
analysis, it is worthwhile to examine what analytical techniques are appropriate
for application to these different features.

13

ELINOR OSTROM & ROBERT 0. KEOHANiE, LoCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE

(1995).
14

Ronald Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, 4:16 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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D. Public Interest and Public Choice in
International Organizations
Economic analysis of international organizations must operate at two
levels." At the second level is the relationship between states in pursuit of their
individual decisions based on their own state preferences. At this level, we can
think in terms of maximization of state preferences, viewing the state as a black
box that engages in international relations, and without questioning the source
of its expressed preferences.
At the first level is the constellation of domestic politics in each state. This
is where state preferences are formed, and of course state preferences are not
simply the sum of citizen preferences. Just as state preferences may be formed in
a way that is inconsistent with the sum of citizen preferences, international
organizations may be formed in a way that is inconsistent with citizen
preferences.
In fact, it is possible that international organizations are used to enhance
the ability of certain political elites or interest groups to affect their preferred
policies at the expense of the broader populace." Here, we can readily see that
delegation could have adverse welfare effects on citizens. It might allow
governments to hide their actions, or otherwise to avoid accountability for their
actions. It might allow governments to collude, diminishing the value of
competition in the supply of governmental goods."
These levels of analysis are not exclusive: both the public interest and the
public choice approach have explanatory power. Political operatives carry out
the public interest to some extent due to mechanisms for accountability or
altruism. Therefore, a model that included in the determinants of national policy
only public welfare would be deficient, as would a model that included in the
determinants of national policy only political official welfare. Rather, national
policy will be determined by a combination of the welfare of political actors and
their constituents. Public choice models that include public welfare as a
determinant of political welfare are sufficient to do so. So are public welfare
models that recognize the mediating effect of politics.
Future analytical models may incorporate behavioral economics
perspectives. For example, biases toward loss aversion may result in

15

See generally Robert D. Putnam, Dip lomacy and Domestic Poltics: The Logic of Two-Ieel Games, 42 INT'l
ORG. 427 (1988).

16

See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A PUBuc CHOICE
APPROACH (Roland Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1991).

17

Id. at 27-40.
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systematically inadequate delegation to international organizations, giving rise to
a conservative sovereigntist bias.
Whatever model is chosen, there will be circumstances in which a greater
aggregate of public and political welfare may be achieved by international
cooperation, and a narrower group of circumstances in which international
organizations are utilized to do so. To the extent that public welfare is a vector
in national decision-making, national governments will tend to seek international
cooperation that enhances public welfare.
Finally, it is appropriate to mention the possibility that a particular
international organization may have little substantive function-little effect on
the behavior of states. Perhaps this is because it is intended to serve a public
relations function, or an obfuscatory function. While this is certainly a plausible
possibility in some circumstances, it would not be plausible to argue that
international organizations in general are designed to have little effect. This
position is refuted by the variety of organizational structures and by the way that
states seem to believe important things are at stake in organizational action. The
fact that international organizations generally may affect behavior does not mean
that the power of states is not important when an international organization is
delegated authority. We can expect powerful states to play disproportionate roles
in structuring and in operating international organizations." Indeed, we might
observe that while the UN Security Council may have little independence vis-avis the permanent five veto-wielding members, it has substantial independence
vis-A-vis other states.
II. DELEGATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Why are formal international organizations created, and why is formal legal
power delegated from states to international organizations?" Delegation is here
the dependent variable. Transaction costs theory, agency theory, and game
theory can provide plausible public interest rationales-sources of plausible
independent variables. Public choice theory, on the other hand, suggests that
domestic politicians may delegate authority to international organizations where
they can garner more political support, perhaps by blaming international
organizations for unpopular actions, by seeking to legitimate policies through
international organization support, or by obscuring action from public view by
carrying it out through an international organization. However, public choice
theory also can utilize transaction costs theory, agency theory, and game theory

18

See RANDALL W. STONE, CONTROLLING INSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE GLOBAL EcONOMY (2011).

19

See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 3.
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in order to understand how self-interested political actors might establish
international organizations in order to further their own interests. 20
In their early work on international organizations, Abbott and Snidal
included "independence" as a core aspect of international organizations.2 1
Indeed, without independence there is no delegation. That is, it is implicit in the
concept of delegation that authority is shifted to the international organization in
a way that individual states cannot completely control. It is important to say that
by "independence," I do not refer to a "Frankenstein" international organization
as Andrew Guzman has described, that might depart from the mandate of its
collective principal. 22 So, the critical measure of "dependence" is the degree to
which individual members may control decisions, and the critical measure of
independence is the degree to which they cannot.
Using a random sample of international agreements, Barbara Koremenos
finds that delegation is widespread, and that it often operates through dispute
settlement.23 The definition of delegation that Koremenos uses focuses on
powers, without assessing how independently international organizations
exercise their powers. 24
Compared to the delegation between domestic citizens and domestic
governments, it seems that relatively little authority is actually delegated to
international organizations. According to the principle of subsidiarity, this fact
tells us little about the level of delegation to international organizations from a
normative standpoint. International organizations are not states-they serve a
different function. Therefore, the interesting question is whether the level of
delegation observed matches well with the cooperation problems addressed by
international organizations.
International organizations may serve to solve coordination problems
through surveillance and communication, and to solve cooperation problems
through similar techniques where surveillance and communication can support a

20

21

See generally Joel P. Trachtman, InternationalLaw and Domestic Poltical Coalitions: The Grand Theory of
Compliance with InternationalLaw, 11 CHI.J. INT'L L. 127 (2010).
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 3, at 16-23.

J. INT'L L. 999

22

Andrew Guzman, International Organizations and the Frankenstein Problem, 24 EUR.
(2013).

2

Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why do States Choose to Delegate, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
151 (2008).

24

Id. at 152.
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cooperative equilibrium.25 States seldom address cooperation problems by
providing full authority to act and enforce to an international organization.2 6
It might be argued that the UN Security Council is exceptional in this
regard, although the permanent members' veto, as well as the need for member
action to carry out decisions, imposes important limits on the degree to which
authority can be seen as delegated to the Security Council. A more plausible
exception is the legislative and adjudicative authority of the European Union,
although some may argue that the European Union is sui geneis. Other important
exceptions include voting in the IMF and World Bank, which involve weighted
voting, voting in technical organizations such as the Codex Alimenatarius
regarding food safety standards, and in the International Maritime Organization
regarding shipping safety standards.
In connection with adjudication in the European Court' of Justice, the
European Court of Human Rights, the WTO, the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, or within mixed arbitration facilities provided under bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), broader authority appears to be delegated to these
components of international organizations (even though BITs generally lack
formal organizational structures, they utilize organizations such as the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes).
This type of authority seems to be intended to resolve information and
credibility problems among the principals.27 Some discretion must be accorded to
agents where the principals seek to enhance the creditability of their
commitments: "[a]n agent bound to follow the directions of the delegating
politicians could not possibly enhance the ... commitment."28 The growing
literature of international administrative law seems focused on the separate issue
of principal-agent problems between the international organization and member
states or their citizens."
Below, I review three theoretical perspectives relevant to the explanation of
delegation to international organizations: transaction costs theory, principalagent theory, and game theory. I also discuss how these perspectives affect the
25

26

27

See generally HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC
POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1997).
See general# Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth ofInternationalDelegation, 96 CAL. L.
REV. 1693 (2008).
DARREN G. HARKINS & WADE JACOBY, DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, 199-228 (Darren G. Hawkins, et al. eds., 2006).

28

Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegaion:Agency and Fiduciary Reladons in EU Governance, 2
EUR. UNION POL. 103,110 (2001).

29

The literature is now extensive. For an introduction, see generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., The
Emergence of GlobalAdministraiveIw, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
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decision as to the breadth of coverage, and linkage, within an international
organization.
A. Transaction Costs Theory
The Coasean theory of the firm hypothesizes that the reason individuals
create firms (in our case, organizations) is transaction cost reduction.30 The best
way to think about this hypothesis is in terms of cost-benefit analysis. There are
gains to be achieved from cooperation, and there are sovereignty costs
associated with cooperation. Where there are positive net gains from
cooperation and they exceed the transaction costs of cooperation, we would
expect to observe cooperation. The need to consider gains from cooperation
and sovereignty costs makes the transaction costs framework difficult to
operationalize, just as the need to consider preferences makes the transaction
cost framework difficult to operationalize in domestic policy analysis. States
would be expected to seek to maximize their net benefits from cooperation by
utilizing the institutional structure that maximizes the net transaction gains, net
of transaction costs. The choices range from case-by-case cooperation to
organizationally structured cooperation (analogous to the continuum between
the market and the firm).
There are three broad categories of transaction costs in the international
cooperation context. First, organizations can reduce transaction costs by
reducing the costs of identifying, evaluating, and negotiating a Pareto-improving
transaction. International organizations may address these costs through the
application of expertise and by facilitating negotiations through secretariat
services.
Second, transaction costs economizing can be extended to include game
theoretic perspectives by including in transaction costs the costs of overcoming
strategic barriers to cooperation. To the extent that the strategic context in
which states find themselves maps into a prisoner's dilemma or another strategic
model that could be resolved efficiently by a change in the payoffs effected
through legal rules, an international organization might be useful. As discussed
in more detail below, an organization can reduce the costs of inefficient strategic
behavior by, for example, supplying information, certifying information,
completing an incomplete contract, or changing the structure of retaliation and
the payoff from defection. If these cost reductions, combined with the value of
cooperation, are greater than the costs of cooperation, including sovereignty
costs, then the organization may be justified.

30

See generally Coase, supra note 14.
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Third, transaction costs economizing can be extended to include principalagent analysis by including in transaction costs the cost of reducing agency
problems. (I discuss principal-agent theory separately below.) Again, if the net
benefits, after taking into account the costs of addressing agency costs, are
positive, then an organization may be justified.
It is not possible to determine in the abstract whether an international
organization would have greater net transaction gains compared to those
resulting from a simple treaty without a specific organization formed around the
treaty. Rather, this question can only be answered in connection with specific
cooperation problems, and, importantly, in connection with the particular
organizational design proposed. The question of which would have greater net
benefits is to a great extent dependent on the question of the structure of the
international organization. So, the comparative question is not between having
an organization and having no organization, but is instead between having no
organization and having different types of organization. The methodology that is
indicated is comparative institutional analysis, proposing a variety of alternative
institutional structures, and evaluating which is most likely to maximize net
benefits. If the net benefits are negative, then cooperation is unattractive.
Oliver Williamson sees transaction costs economizing as the main purpose
of vertical integration-of formation of organizations.3 Vertical integration is
seen as a governance response to a particular set of transaction dimensions,
including high asset specificity as the principal factor. In the international law
context, asset specificity occurs when one state makes investments that are
dependent for their value on the cooperation of other states. For example,
consider a "weakest link" public good, in which each state must invest to create
the public good, but any state's investment is wasted unless all states contribute.
Assuming asset specificity, it may be useful to establish devices to constrain
opportunism in order to realize gains from cooperation, depending on the costs
and benefits of these devices. Organizations may be used to constrain
opportunism. Organizations may specify discrete rules, but are, under positive
transaction costs, always incomplete. Even the discrete rules are incomplete in
their interpretation, application and enforcement.
States may use a variety of methods to complete their contracts ex post.
One method is simply to negotiate regarding new circumstances as they come
up. This method, which is the default international law position, may give rise to
stalemates or inefficient strategic behavior. A second method is to provide for a
legislative system that involves less than full unanimity, or that has other
expediting characteristics. A third method, with a somewhat different domain, is
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to provide for dispute settlement, with all of the varieties of dispute settlement
structure that may be available. Koremenos finds greater delegation under
32
complexity, and also that delegation is often in the form of dispute settlement.
So, in determining whether an international organization would be useful,
it would be important to evaluate the strategic setting, the magnitude of the
payoffs, the capacity for informal enforcement, and other aspects of the
circumstances. It is a complex determination, as the types of commitments that
would be appropriate are interdependent with the types of institutional
structures that would be appropriate to enforce them, including the design of the
international organization.
B. Principal-Agent Theory
As Coase suggested, we must compare the costs of transactions in the
market with the costs of operations within an organization. Within an
organization, much of the question of transaction costs can be understood in
terms of agency costs. Thus, a related lens by which to view delegation is
through principal-agent theory, in which a collective principal (the member
states) delegates certain authority to an agent (the international organization) in
order to accomplish particular purposes.33 The agent cannot be expected to be
perfectly faithful to the principal: agents may shirk their duties and may take
advantage of the principal's trust. The costs occasioned by shirking and selfdealing, and by measures designed to limit shirking and self-dealing, are "agency
costs." Measures designed to limit shirking and self-dealing must overcome
information problems in connection with monitoring agent performance, and
must provide for effective responsive control.
Grants of authority from a principal to an agent may be structured with
greater specificity (rules) or lesser specificity (standards). Under lesser specificity,
the agent exercises more discretion. Agency contracts can never be complete,
and so agents always exercise some discretion. For example, under the US
constitutional context, standards such as "due process" delegate a great deal of
discretion to judges to determine what is required.
Principal-agent theorists in political science view the level of discretion
granted to agents "as the result of conflict between principal and agent
preferences, the ability of principals to write detailed rules, the degree of conflict
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among collective principals, and the availability of alternative means by which
the principals can control the conduct of agents."34
C. Game Theory
Delegation is simply a grant of authority over a particular issue area.
Considered alone, it is no different from the grant of authority over a particular
behavior that arises from the creation of a legal or contractual rule without an
organizational structure.
The game theoretic analysis of delegation of authority to international
organizations is based in the first instance on the game theoretic analysis of
international law in general. International legal rules that impose costs in
connection with violation can change the payoffs from defection and, therefore,
change the structure of the game. International organizations can be used to
improve the credibility of states' commitments, by monitoring compliance and
completing incomplete contracts." This can be critical to avoiding a prisoner's
dilemma in which the dominant strategy is defection, but it can also be
important in other strategic contexts. For example, even in a coordination game,
such as a stag hunt, where there are no direct incentives to defect, it may be that
concerns about the reliability of compliance by others lead to defection in order
to achieve a smaller payoff than that available from cooperation. With legal rules
that add to the costs of defection, players may rely more on compliance by
others, and therefore have a greater incentive to comply themselves.
What causes states to enter into a treaty creating an international
organization? As suggested above, we must begin by asking what causes states to
enter into international law.36 Epstein and O'Halloran develop a formal model of
delegation, focusing on the degree of policy distance between the policy adopted
by the international organization and the ideal policies of its member states.37
Their approach focuses on discrete policies developed as an offer by the
international organization, in anticipation of responses by possible member
states. In other words, Epstein and O'Halloran assume that states know what
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policy they want at the time that they enter into the organization." This accords
well with their assumption that states can always withdraw from an international
organization," so that, in effect, the "entry" game is a continuous game, and a
constraint on international organization independence. Because the game
continues, states do always know their policy goal and can act on it at any given
moment. The possibility of exit eliminates uncertainty.
However, where exit is a costless option, we might say that there is no real
delegation in a formal sense: states simply are not bound by the rules or
decisions of the organization because they can dis-apply those rules or decisions
at any time. Koremenos finds that explicit withdrawal clauses are significantly
correlated with the variable she terms "delegation," suggesting that withdrawal
clauses are a way of reducing sovereignty costs.' This suggestion seems correct,
but somewhat trivial: as the cost of exit is reduced, the binding force of
international law is also reduced, and sovereignty costs are consequently
reduced. The cost of exit must be taken into account in assessing the extent of
delegation. In order for delegation in the sense I have used it to exist, exit cannot
be costless. As costs of exit decline, the degree of delegation declines.
The assumption that states can withdraw is formally valid for most
international organizations, but there may indeed be international organizations
that provide no formal means of exit, and there may also be important informal
4
inducements to remain within an international organization after entering it. 1
Formal rules may be given power by informal costs of exit. The costs of exit
may be positive, even if they are not strictly prohibitive. There are relatively few
instances of states exiting international organizations.
We might assume that states will only remain members of an international
organization to the extent that the discounted value of future payoffs from
membership, plus the cost of exit, is greater than the costs of membership. In
this sense, an international organization for which this condition is true would
be self-enforcing. So, it is entirely possible that a single adverse decision or rule
would not be sufficient to induce a state to exit.
Given formal and informal constraints on exit, it may be useful to relax the
assumption that states can exit without cost, and under these circumstances,
there is uncertainty how delegation will affect any given state's policy
preferences. Given uncertainty, we might say that delegation occurs in a
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"constitutional moment" in the Buchanan and Tullock sense: 4 2 a moment at
which a Harsanyian "veil of uncertainty" allows states to agree on constitutional
change even though, indeed, because, they are uncertain of the possible future
results of the delegation.
D. Scope and Linkage
A discussion of delegation must include the question of what issues are
included within a single international orgamization structure, and the issue of
scope of issues covered is in turn related to membership. The choice of issues to
address within a single structure may depend on issues such as economies of
scale and scope in connection with the international organization mechanism.
On the other hand, the choice of issues may depend on the ability to
construct a "package" that will be acceptable to the participants at the outset,
and that will be "self-enforcing" as a package moving forward. States may
delegate authority-accept rules or mechanisms that can make rules in the future
without their additional consent-over a particular area of concern to other
states only in exchange for reciprocal commitments by the other states. Under
asymmetry, the reciprocal commitments would be required to include other
areas with complementary asymmetric profiles. 43 For example, if India wants
greater market access for certain manufactured goods in the US, the US may
demand greater market access in India for other goods in which the US has
commercial interests, or the US may demand greater protection of intellectual
property rights in India.
In game theory studies of cooperation over time, one of the critical factors
that can determine cooperation is "the shadow of the future." The shadow of
the future refers to the possibility that non-cooperation today will produce
retaliation in the future." The power of the shadow of the future is affected by
the degree of linkage among issues, and the frequency and magnitude of future
opportunities for retaliation. The frequency may be increased-and its power
thereby magnified-by expanding the scope of issues that are linked to one
another. Thus, for example, if the game is not the narrower game of prescriptive
jurisdiction in antitrust, but the broader game of prescriptive jurisdiction more
generally, or the even broader game of international law compliance, the play is
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repeated more frequently, allowing greater opportunities for retaliation and
greater incentives for compliance.
One of the assumptions underlying game models such as the prisoner's
dilemma is that the game is self-contained. Casual observation of international
society suggests that there are many linkages, however, with the result that few
issues can be isolated. Players can bind one another in a variety of ways,
45
including by linking the present game to other games in a "supergame."
Firms-and states-operate in multiple markets and encounter other
firms, or states, in multiple contexts: as competitor here, as supplier there, as
coconspirator elsewhere. Industrial organization economists studying the effect
of multimarket contact have found that this cross-sectoral activity may support
cooperation. For example, Giancarlo Spagnolo has noted that in the case of
multimarket contact, cooperation "can be viable in a set of markets even when
in the absence of multimarket contact it could not be supported in any of these
markets."' This is a powerful corrective for scholars who examine individual
international law rules or treaties to inquire whether they are self-enforcing.
One important difference between the commercial context and the
international relations context is that state relations in the international context
almost always cross a number of sectors. States relate to one another in a variety
of contexts, with varying roles in each context. In one context, a particular state
may be concerned about the scope of its prescriptive jurisdiction, whereas in
another context it may be concerned about the scope of its responsibilities to
protect foreign diplomats. As a result, while there may be a "carbon reduction
game" that is separate from the "trade liberalization game," these games can be
linked. In fact, states regularly link issues in international relations, with the
result that it is not possible to establish precise boundaries for any particular
game: "with all side payments prohibited, there is no assurance that collective
action will be taken in the most productive way."4
This discussion suggests that international cooperation in different sectors
may be mutually supportive, and that there may be a kind of network effect that
makes each additional instance of cooperation more attractive than it would be
absent existing instances. This game-theoretic perspective provides support for
the early neo-functionalist hypotheses regarding international economic
integration.4 8 Broader organizations may allow this type of mutual support with
45
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reduced transaction costs, and perhaps greater legitimacy, and may also offer
economies of scale and scope. On the other hand, broader organizations could
reduce the domain of interorganizational competition.
However, it is important to point out that this mutual support is not
dependent upon inclusion within a single organization. A Ronald Coase or
Herbert Simon perspective recognizes the essential fungibility between internal
organizational arrangements and contractual arrangements in a market. In the
present context, this means that it does not necessarily matter whether functions
are separated in function-specific international organizations or are integrated
within a single organization, such as the UN or perhaps the WTO4 9 Within a
single organization, the critical question will be how these different concerns or
functions are integrated. Furthermore, under path dependence, given that the
WTO exists, and no World Environmental Organization yet exists, there may be
actions, such as adding functional environmental responsibility to the WTO, that
make sense today yet would not make sense were the starting point different.
III. LEGISLATION
International organizations can be created to preside over a static set of
rules, in which case there would be no delegation in a legislative sense. Rather,
new rules would be made through the default rules of the general international
law system.
It is also possible to accord international organizations decision-making or
legislative power of various kinds, and this legislative power is one type of
delegation. However, it is unusual for international organizations to have
legislative power based on majority voting.so Examples of some that do include
the European Union, the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN Security Council in
particular circumstances. I do not include the World Trade Organization
because, despite formal provisions for decision-making by majority voting,
decisions are generally made only by consensus, and larger normative changes
require amendments, which only bind their signatories.
Giovanni Maggi and Massimo Morelli show that a key parameter in
determining whether to choose majority voting is the governments' discount
factors, representing their patience. 5 As Maggi and Morelli explain, their model
49
50
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posits that "the voting rule is chosen ex ante, under a veil of ignorance about
future issues. Thus, the optimal voting rule maximizes the ex ante expected
utility of the representative member subject to self-enforcement constraint: a
government must have incentive to comply with the collective decision even if it
happens to disagree with it." 52
With high discount factors-greater valuation of future payoffs from
cooperation-there are smaller incentives for defection, and less need for what
Maggi and Morelli determine are the compliance benefits of a rule of unanimity.
Greater likelihood of repeated play and greater frequency of interactionincreasing the amount at stake over a shorter time-also promote compliance.
But note that the frequency of interaction parameter need not be limited to
interaction within a particular organization or issue area.53
Thus, their model "predicts that a non-unanimous rule is more likely to be
adopted in organizations where governments are more stable, and in 'busier'
organizations." " They also find that greater correlation in the preferences
among member states increases the likelihood of a non-unanimous voting rule.
Furthermore, a non-unanimous rule may be efficient where there is external
enforcement.
Conversely, Maggi and Morelli also show that where an international
agreement must be self-enforcing (there is no external enforcement), an
organizational rule of unanimity (or consensus) may be efficient under certain
circumstances. In order to do so, they find that unanimity eliminates the
possibility for defection, but there are at least two reasons why this would often
not be the case. First, states may vote cynically, never intending to comply with
the resulting rule, but perhaps hoping that others will do so." Second, even
without cynicism, unanimity can result from "package deals" under
circumstances in which a state agreeing to the package would prefer not to
comply with one or more components of the package." In addition,
circumstances may change such that a domestic political equilibrium that
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supported entry into the relevant obligation no longer exists to support
compliance with the obligation."
Consent would tend to imply compliance in circumstances only (i) where
consent is known to be based on domestic political support for the behavior that
constitutes compliance (even then the domestic political equilibrium may change
so as to undermine the tendency to comply); and/or (ii) where the giving of
consent activates a lobby that believes that promises should be kept. So, consent
is not sufficient for compliance, but nor is it necessary for compliance, because,
as I have argued above, multi-sector contact may induce compliance in a way
that makes the larger relationship self-enforcing while the narrower rule is not.
Indeed, Maggi and Morelli suggest that the availability of transfers expands the
range of discount factors for which a rule of majority voting is sustainable.
But perhaps even more importantly, the assumption that most rules of
international law or treaties must be self-enforcing may be too strong as well.
The common understanding of international law in the economics literature
assumes is that for international law to be effective, it must have the
characteristics of a self-enforcing contract." The tools of analysis used by
economics for particular legal rules or regimes is thus non-cooperative game
theory, where it is assumed to be impossible to enter into exogenously binding
contracts. Rather, the internal dynamics of the rule or regime must be structured
so that it is endogenously binding-so that it has internal dynamics that will
result in compliance.
Much of this analytical perspective is factually dependent on the definition
of the scope of the game being played. For example, if the game is isolated as
the "reduction of tariffs on bananas game," or even as the broader "trade
liberalization game," then perhaps the requirement for self-enforcing contracts is
appropriate. If instead, we understand the trade liberalization game as part of a
broader "general international law game," then it is not true that the trade
liberalization component must itself be self-enforcing. Rather, the question is
whether the general international law game is self-enforcing. Similarly, in
domestic society, we do not need to ask whether the domestic "environmental
protection game" is self-enforcing, because it is embedded in a broader legal and
constitutional system. The domestic system starts out equally anarchic to the
international system. 9
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It is true that in anarchy, we must search for self-enforcing agreements. But
similar to the fundamental basis for domestic law, the self-enforcing character of
international law must be assessed looking at the totality of the international law
relationships between states, rather than by isolating individual relationships.
There is a much greater possibility for reciprocity, and for what we might call a
self-enforcing system, when we examine the entire set of relationships, and
examine them across time, than when we examine a single obligation. The
economists' perspective, expecting individual legal rules or organizations to be
self-enforcing when considered separately and in the short term, is both ignorant
of the networked power of law and impotent to address long-term, highly asset
specific, and asymmetric, cooperation problems. As to both domestic law and
international law, we might say that each individual thread of obligation may be
weak or strong-if it is weak, it will be unable to sustain cooperation. However,
once a variety of threads are woven together in a "fabric" of society, the fabric
can be considerably stronger than any individual thread.
One important finding of the Maggi and Morelli work is that if external
enforcement is available, the ex ante efficient rule is typically some type of
majority voting."o But I have argued above that a rule of unanimity, as suggested
by Maggi and Morelli, would not necessarily solve enforcement problems,
because unanimity does not necessarily imply subsequent compliance. So there
may be fewer circumstances in which a rule of unanimity would be attractive.
IV. ADJUDICATION
Dispute settlement has at least a dual role." First, it is a tool by which
states can begin to enforce rules. Second, it is also a method of completing an
inter-national contract. Thus, dispute settlement includes two types of
delegation. Both require some degree of independence in order to constitute
delegation." Enforcement is predicated on the ability to complete the contract in
order to determine the rights and duties of the parties. But it is possible to
determine the rights and duties without further formal enforcement activities.
Therefore these two functions should be evaluated and structured to some
extent independently.
Under significant uncertainty as to the future state of affairs, states would
wish to establish complex state-contingent contracts. However, contracting is
60
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costly, limiting the ability to specify state contingencies. On the other hand, by
specifying general "standards," and delegating to dispute settlement bodies the
responsibility to apply these standards, states are able to include complex statecontingency in their contracts, with significantly lower variable contracting costs.
This problem has been examined most extensively in the international
trade area, and the insights developed seem adaptable to other areas of
international organization. Horn, Maggi, and Staiger have argued that the WTO
can be viewed as an incomplete contract whose form is endogenously
determined." They find that the WTO includes an interesting combination of
"igidity, in the sense that contractual obligations are largely insensitive to
changes in economic (and political) conditions, and discretion, in the sense that
governments have substantial leeway in the setting of many policies."' They
observe that "there is a wide arry of poliy instruments-border measures and
especially 'domestic' measures-that should be constrained to keep in check
each government's incentives to act opportunistically.""
Under significant uncertainty as to the future state of affairs, states would
wish to establish complex state-contingent contracts. In the area of domestic
regulation, the magnitude of domestic benefits from the regulation, and the
magnitude of harm to foreign persons, is uncertain. However, contracting is
costly, limiting the ability to specify state-contingencies in detail. On the other
hand, by specifying general standards, and delegating to dispute settlement
bodies the responsibility to apply these standards, states are able to include
complex state-contingency in their contracts, with significantly lower variable
contracting costs.
The need for state-contingent contracting in order to promote efficiency in
the trade-off between domestic regulation and international trade suggests that
dispute settlement in international trade will continue to be an important
institutional feature. That is, the problem is not necessarily that there are
unexpected disputes because of a failure to agree clearly on specific rules.
Rather, it is efficient not to agree on more specific rules and to leave
determination under specific circumstances to dispute settlement. In these cases,
it is better to have general standards rather than more specific rules. Many areas
of international law have a similar dynamic. Of course, the design of a dispute
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settlement mechanism is intimately related to the types of commitments that
would be included in an international treaty."
A somewhat different role for dispute settlement is to facilitate a rule of
efficient breach, by reliably calculating damages. An international agreement may
be designed to allow efficient breach, whereby a state may avoid its obligations
by paying specified damages to the obligee state. This is expected to be efficient
where the value of violation is greater than the value of the calculated damages.
But an escape clause of this nature is dependent on an independent third party
to calculate the damages.
In the enforcement role, dispute settlement declares who is right and who
is wrong, removing the subject treaty from the default international legal
mechanism of auto-interpretation. This declarative role can have important
informal effects, and these may be sufficient to induce the desired level of
compliance even without formal remedies.6 I discuss the enforcement role
below.
V. ENFORCEMENT AND SURVEILLANCE
Like legislation and adjudication, enforcement is a type of delegation. States
delegate enforcement capability to international organizations in order to address
cooperation problems by increasing the costs of defection in a way that could
not be done, or done as efficiently, without an organization. While states
themselves may participate in enforcement actions, the international
organization may engage in surveillance, or in determining and publicizing
violation, supporting state action.
Models of international cooperation are often based on a prisoner's
dilemma, with a self-enforcing equilibrium resulting from an assumption of a
grim trigger strategy in response to defection, and a shadow of the future that
exceeds in value the one-time benefits of defection. The theoretical problem
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with the grim trigger strategy is that because it is collectively irrational it is not
"renegotiation-proof.""
That is, after a defection, a coalition of states will have incentives to come
together and cooperate with the defector, depriving the grim trigger of credibility
and therefore effectiveness. The reasoning is that equilibrium strategies that
enforce cooperative outcomes by the use of this type of punishment can be
undermined by the deviator offering to renegotiate, proposing that the
punishment phase be abandoned in favor of a return to cooperation: a "let
bygones be bygones" argument. 0
A dispute resolution mechanism that is neutral, upon which states cannot
exercise undue influence, can limit the possibility of defection under these
circumstances. 7' Even though the organization may have no actual enforcement
power, its ability to delay judgment and to impose ex ante unknown costs on the
parties provide incentives for cooperation.
In addition, enforcement by an organization can solve second order
collective action problems in punishing defection. "Punishment almost
invariably is costly to the punisher, while the benefits from punishment are
diffusely distributed over all members. It is, in fact, a public good." 72 Theory
suggests that these public goods may be undersupplied-in the case of this
second order (the first being the cooperation problem being addressed)
collective action problem, defectors will not be punished sufficiently. By
establishing an international organization to carry out punishment, or to ensure
that punishment is carried out, the second order collective action problem may
be overcome, providing a credible threat of punishment, and therefore resulting
in an equilibrium of compliance.
An organization can also solve problems of asymmetric information. As
Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast argue with respect to the
non-state institutions that enforced compliance among early medieval
69
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merchants, "[i]t is the costliness of generating and communicating
information-rather than the infrequency of trade in any particular bilateral
relationship-that, we argue, is the problem that the system of private
enforcement was designed to overcome." 7 In developing this view, the authors
argue that third-party dispute settlement can assist in developing cooperation.
They argue, in particular, that third-party dispute settlement can solve the
following information problem: if two parties have a dispute in which one
accuses the other of defection, how can other members of the community
determine whether the accusation is true? 74 Milgrom, North, and Weingast
conclude that within the municipal context, given the lack of empirical evidence
about the costs of running different kinds of institutions, it is not possible to
develop a formal model to show that their proposal for third-party dispute
settlement (with the equivalent of a law merchant) minimizes information costs.
They opine, however, that such a system seems to incur only the kind of costs
that are inevitable, and that it seems well designed to minimize those costs. The
Milgrom, North and Weingast "law merchant" is a private purveyor of
information and evaluation. The players accept its use in order to develop an
efficient equilibrium.
We might consider the extent to which formal international institutions
such as the International Court of Justice, the WTO's dispute settlement process
or its Trade Policy Review Mechanism fulfill a similar role in connection with
states, and whether NGOs such as Amnesty International or the World Wildlife
Fund, or informal institutions such as the Basle Committee (bank regulation) or
the Waasenar Arrangement (export controls on dual use commodities), can do
so in particular niches. In the context of the WTO, Giovanni Maggi argues that
this type of law merchant role in multilateral dispute settlement tends to be more
important when there are stronger bilateral imbalances of power across states."
Greater compliance may be a result of fear of either multilateral retaliation,
or reputational effects, although the difference between these two phenomena is
largely a matter of the motivation of third states. Tribunal declarations may also
mobilize domestic constituencies to induce compliance."
Where the declaration alone is deemed insufficient to induce the desired
level of compliance, dispute settlement can be the basis for imposition of
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penalties or authorization of retaliation against the violating state. Thus, dispute
settlement has an important role in inducing compliance with international law."
VI. MEMBERSHIP
The number of members necessary to make entry into an international
organization worthwhile depends on several factors, including most importantly
the type of cooperation problem that the international organization addresses.
For example, if the problem involves a public good that can only be created if all
states participate (a "weakest link" public good), then membership must include
all states. In other contexts, there appears to be a tradeoff between degree of
delegation, on the one hand, and breadth of membership, on the other hand."
Presumably, this is because of variation in the preferences and patience of
different states.
If cooperation depends on an equilibrium of universal compliance," as
suggested above, it may be appropriate to exclude states that are relatively
impatient and therefore less likely (require a bigger future payoff) to comply. It
depends, of course, on the magnitude of future payoffs compared to the benefits
of defection. In this way, the extent of membership may depend on the scope of
delegation: a package deal that is more likely to result in greater incentives for
continued compliance may be sustainable among a broader group of members.
If it is possible to exclude states that are more impatient or that have less interest
in the cooperative outcome, such exclusion may be appropriate.
Uncertainty regarding the preferences of states in the future may suggest
excluding states that are near the margins." On the other hand, uncertainty
regarding preferences may promote stochastic symmetry that can induce
agreement regarding majority voting or binding dispute settlement institutions:
under uncertainty regarding their own preferences over issues that may arise in
the future, states can be expected to agree to institutions that maximize
aggregate welfare on a probabilistic basis, even if their actual eventual welfare is
impaired.
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Theory does not generally predict, however, that "the more severe the
enforcement problem, the more restricted the membership." 1 This proposition
is based on the work of Mancur Olson. Olson based his perspective on the
assumptions that the benefit of cooperation declines with the number of players,
that the costs of monitoring increase with the number of players, and that the
costs of organizing retaliation increase with the number of players. However,
these assumptions are general conjectures about the world and are not
necessarily true in any particular circumstances. Moreover, these assumptions are
only a subset of the parameters worth considering.82 Furthermore, in the case of
club goods-for which the benefits are excludible-a cooperative equilibrium is
easier to establish. 83
Epstein and O'Halloran posit that international organizations are held
together by network externalities, such as free trade.84 A network externality
exists for an institution when the value of the institution to any one party
increases as additional parties are added. Not all international cooperation
problems will have the characteristic of network externalities. This is easily seen
in connection with regional organizations or organizations that address a
problem of concern to only a subset of states. There may be transaction costs or
strategic reasons why adding additional states may reduce welfare instead of
increasing welfare for each state. Indeed, it may also be true that strategic limits
on cooperation can become greater as more welfare is produced," so that
network externalities would not hold an international organization together.
VII. SYNERGIES
Each international organization is designed to respond to a particular
international relations context. As noted at the outset, the different features of
international organizations interact with one another, so the sum is definitely
different from the parts. In addition, it is worth noting that the features of
international organizations are implicitly embedded in, and combined with, the
general international law system.
This Article focuses on formal powers, so my definition of "delegation"
focuses on formal authority, or jurisdiction. This is generally exercised through
the ability to make binding legal rules or decisions through legislation or
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adjudication. So, the measure of delegation is dependent on the measure of
bindingness of law. This is not so much a matter of synergy as one of definition.
But it is also true, again as a definitional matter, that voting or procedural rules
that give individual states the ability to avoid the binding force of law reduce the
scope of delegation. In this sense, "independence" is necessary for delegation.
Conversely, states may be willing to accord greater nominal authority to an
international organization if they can undermine its independence through
mechanisms that give individual states control over legislation or adjudication.
For example, the UN Security Council could not have been accorded the powers
that it has without according a veto to the permanent five members.
But it is also true that a blanket rule of "dependence," or non-delegation,
would have to be predicated on a view that binding law is never useful, or that
the ability to make binding law without unanimity is never useful. Not all
international relations issues require binding law, but some do." And we have
seen that the circumstances under which a voting rule of unanimity is likely to be
optimal are limited. The design question for drafters of treaties forming
international organizations is that of the extent of the utility in the context at
hand of law that is based on less-than-unanimous voting, or dispute settlement
that is independent.
There is also an interaction between delegation and membership, insofar as
some states might view a rule of less-than-unanimous voting, or dispute
settlement that is independent, as providing net probabilistic benefits, while
others may not. Under these circumstances, the latter group of states would be
excluded, or would require a payoff of some sort. Whether the benefits to the
former group are sufficient to fund the payoff to the latter would determine
whether the formation of the organization for the broader group is KaldorHicks efficient.
We have also seen that there is an interaction between enforceability and
membership-each state can be expected to make its own calculation of
whether to comply or not, based on its own preferences and patience. If the
international organization's benefits would be undermined by non-compliance
by some group of states, then it may be beneficial to exclude from membership
states less likely to comply. Of course, if the exclusion of such states would
reduce the benefits produced by the international organization below the level of
its costs to members, then the international organization would not be expected
to be formed.
Finally, there is a relationship between adjudication and legislation, which
may be one of complementarity or substitutability, depending on the
86
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circumstances. Binding adjudication may provide a mechanism by which to
complete a treaty in a way that makes the treaty viable, and so may complement
the legislation. On the other hand, there are circumstances in which states may
be able to make a rule only if it is more flexible, and greater flexibility may come
from reliance on the default international legal rule of auto-interpretation, rather
than binding third-party dispute settlement.
In addition, the literature of rules and standards suggests that each of
legislation and adjudication serve different purposes as social tools of decisionmaking. In this sense, they are substitutes, but with different costs and benefits.
VIII. CONCLUSION: VARIATION IN DELEGATION,
LEGISLATION, ADJUDICATION, ENFORCEMENT,
AND MEMBERSHIP
An international organization designer would first assess the international
concern to be addressed. Here we have issues of externalities, international
public goods, or possibilities of economies of scale or scope in providing
government services. Within each of these categories, there is variation. The
core analytical question is concerned with the state's incentives to engage in
cooperative behavior. For example, if the international concern has the
characteristics of a coordination game, each state is interested in joining and
complying, so long as other states do so. If the international concern has the
characteristics of a prisoner's dilemma, each state does best by defecting while
the other states cooperate. If cooperation is more efficient than defection, then
states have a choice of instruments by which to induce cooperation. Informal
means, including surveillance and informal punishment, may provide the optimal
combination of benefits of cooperation and costs of cooperation. International
legal rules, without formal organization, may do so. Or, some form of
international organization may do so. But there are many forms of international
organization. What accounts for variation?
Where the international concern has the characteristics of a coordination
problem, in which states have no incentive to defect, there is no need for
punishment. A forum for communication, and perhaps a system of surveillance
to provide assurance regarding compliance, may be all that is necessary. If the
international concern requires a complex, or a changing, response, there may be
a need for dispute settlement or legislative capacity in order to specify ex ante or
judge ex post what counts as compliance.
Where the international concern has the characteristics of a prisoner's
dilemma, in which defection is the dominant and inefficient strategy, the role of
international law is to modify the payoffs such that the dominant strategy is
cooperation. It is possible that an international legal rule, standing alone, can
modify the payoffs sufficiently. However, there may be circumstances in which
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additional features beyond the international law default system become
appropriate. For example, independent surveillance may solve information
problems regarding compliance so as to facilitate punishment. A dispute
settlement mechanism may solve other information problems. An independent
capacity and mandate to enforce the law, assigned to an international
organization, or perhaps to individual harmed claimants, may address the
second-order collective action problem. that could otherwise undermine
punishment, and therefore, compliance.
All international law is incomplete. While states may use the default
international law system, which largely leaves interpretation and construction to
informal debate among states, in order to address gaps, they may decide instead
to establish a dispute settlement system to do so. They might determine to
establish a system for legislative capacity to fill the gaps as they are identified
using a more deliberate, generalized, and diplomatic, mechanism that puts less
stress on the judicial system.
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